Theories, Concepts and the Rugby World Cup: Using management to understand sport by Adcroft, Andrew & Teckman, Jonathan
 1 
THEORIES, CONCEPTS AND THE RUGBY WORLD CUP: USING 
MANAGEMENT TO UNDERSTAND SPORT  
 
Andy Adcroft and Jon Teckman 
 
Type of Paper: Research paper 
 
Purpose of this paper 
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World Cup in particular. 
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The paper develops a theoretical discussion of performance and competitiveness 
into a conceptual model before using that model to analyse and discuss the 
causes of success and failure in the Rugby World Cup. 
 
Findings 
Understanding the outcome of sporting contests is a complex activity. In the 
examples discussed, success or failure is the product of both the internal 
characteristics of the contestants and the external conditions of the contest itself. 
The findings of the research are robust in their reliability and validity. 
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THEORIES, CONCEPTS AND THE RUGBY WORLD CUP: USING 
MANAGEMENT TO UNDERSTAND SPORT 
 
Introduction 
 
Hegel argued that everyone is a child of their times; what we are, the things we 
do, the beliefs and values we hold are the product of ourselves as individuals and 
the world in which we live. Hegel’s analysis of the individual as having internal 
and external determinants can be broadly applied at the level of organisations 
and much social scientific discourse is careful to place any organisational analysis 
into a broader environmental context where the conditions in one are reflected in 
the behaviour found in the other. In economics, for example, firm behaviour is 
explained by the competitive conditions faced in the marketplace and sociology 
examines the fundamental relationship between the individual and the society in 
which he or she lives. This internal-external relationship is also central in much 
management theory in subject areas like organisational behaviour and corporate 
strategy. For example, whilst Chaharbaghi and Willis (1996) found over fifty 
widely used definitions of corporate strategy, what was central to most of them 
was the relationship between the organisation and the world in which it 
operates. The aim of this paper is to examine this dynamic in the context of 
sport and, in doing so, the paper offers a novel and innovative approach to 
understanding the determinants of contested outcomes in sport. 
 
In using sport as the context for theoretical discussion, this paper accepts Liu et 
al’s (1998) point that “there is an extensive literature available which shows us 
that there is considerable synergy and correlation between sports and business” 
(p.93). Furthermore, Espitia-Escuer and Garcia-Cebrian (2006) suggest two 
general reasons why sport has and can be used as a context for management 
research. First is the widespread interest in sport both within and outside 
academic circles and, second, is the ready availability of statistical data which 
allows for serious empirical research. In explaining these drivers, Espitia-Escuer 
and Garcia-Cebrian identify 13 major studies over the past two and a half 
decades which have used sporting data to make more general management 
points. In these studies the central aim has been to make general points about 
management theory through the use of sporting examples but this paper takes 
an opposite track; our aim is not so much to advance knowledge of management 
theory but rather to demonstrate that management theory can be used to 
advance knowledge of non-traditional contexts for management research, in this 
case sport in general and Rugby World Cup (RWC) in particular. 
 
Our argument, therefore, is that management theory is versatile and allows for 
serious investigation of wider phenomena. This is for four reasons. First, there 
are many issues common to both the study of sport and the study of 
management. For example, success in both areas can be influenced by the 
 3 
judicious use of strategy, motivation, team working and leadership. Second, 
sport is very much concerned with the traditional management task of allocating 
scarce and finite resources in order to muster the best possible outcomes; 
Football teams can only have 11 players, sprint races last for just 100 metres 
and so on. Third, sport offers clear, tangible and measurable outcomes; even in 
complicated games like cricket, for example, there are only four possible results 
and each of these results is clear to all observers. Finally, sport, like business 
strategy, is about contests whether it is the one on one contest of a knock-out 
tournament or the multi-faceted and long term contest of a league. 
 
The paper is organised in a fairly straightforward way. The next section 
establishes the theoretical basis for the investigation through an examination of 
the related concepts of performance orientation and competitive orientation. The 
section develops the theory into a conceptual model which examines the 
dynamic relationship between (internal) performance and (external) 
competitiveness. The next section explains the approach taken to the 
operationalisation of the model and how evidence is developed, analysed and 
utilised. Following on from this explanation of methodology, we present the 
evidence on performance and competitive orientation from the 6 RWCs held 
between 1987 and 2007 before a concluding section considers the implications of 
the research for both the theory of management and the practice of sport. 
 
Literature Review 
 
The initial elements of theory which underpin this paper are the closely related 
issues of performance management and performance measurement. One of the 
main advantages of having this as the point of theoretical departure is that “a 
substantial body of literature on performance management has developed since 
the 1970s” (Boland and Fowler, 2000, p.417) and this body of work has meant 
that “there has been a revolution in performance measurement and performance 
management over the past 20 years with the enormous interest reflecting itself 
in practitioner and academic conferences and papers” (Radnor and McGuire, 
2004, p.246). However, as with many things social scientific, volume does not 
necessarily equate to consensus. For example, in discussing high performance 
management, Lloyd and Payne (2004) suggest that it has “no clear definition” 
and that there is a “fundamental lack of agreement about the specific practices” 
(p.14). The result, therefore, of decades of academic research is a name without 
an agreed meaning and a significant volume of literature which remains 
“impoverished conceptually” (Butler et al. 2004, p.4). 
 
Whilst the link between process and outcome is frequently stated (and often 
assumed), it is not always absolutely clear. On the one hand there is Ness and 
Cucuzza’s (1995) argument that “when it happens you can bet the company’s 
performance will show it” (p. 70) and this clear causality is much supported in 
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the literature. A review of the relevant literature by Ashton and Sung (2002) 
came to the conclusions that “scientific research has now established a strong 
link … and the skills associated with them pays off on the bottom line”. We 
would offer a number of caveats to this position. First, as Butler et al. (2004) 
suggest, the direction of causality has not been fundamentally determined. Are 
organisations successful because they have the best processes or does success 
provide organisations with the time and resources to develop the best processes? 
Second, the direct impact of specific process interventions can be hard to identify 
and, hence, measure. For example, Appelbaum et al. (2000) point out that 
different studies (of similar phenomena) make different claims as to the impacts 
of management interventions. Finally, Williams et al. (1993) argue that there is a 
major problem of complexity because outcomes are determined as much by 
external conditions such as market conditions, industry structures and social 
settlements as they are by purposive management action. 
 
The second problem is that conclusions can be difficult to draw because it always 
depends on what and how things are measured. One of the most influential 
works on organisational design by Huber et al. (1979) suggests that the first step 
towards success is the identification and measurement of the “relevant” 
variables. Only once this is done can interventions be designed, applied and, 
ultimately, assessed for efficacy. One problem with this is the extent to which 
such a deconstructive approach accurately reflects the reality of organisational 
processes. Adcroft and Willis (2005) suggest that the more individual variables 
are identified and measured the less the whole service or organisation is being 
assessed especially when those measures can be chosen to cynically influence 
the perceived outcome. In dealing with this issue, Williams et al. (1993) suggest 
that any sensible choice of measures must always include a combination of 
internal (organisational) and external (environmental) variables which has the 
benefit of providing more accuracy but the drawback of making understanding 
necessarily more complex and difficult. Keep (2000) suggests that this can be 
resolved if performance is examined in terms of both “demand and supply side 
interventions” (p.8) and this is supported by Kaplan and Norton’s (1992) point 
that “managers be able to view performance in several areas simultaneously” 
(p.72). A reasonable summing up of the issue comes from Modell (2004) who 
asks “how does the interplay between different collectives of actors within 
organisations and the institutional macro environment … influence organisational 
actions?” (p.51) before concluding that “more in-depth examination” is needed. 
 
In dealing with Modell’s point, the theoretical/conceptual basis of this paper rests 
on the argument that any outcome enjoyed by an organisation is the product of 
two key factors; the ability of that organisation to perform and the ability of that 
organisation to compete. The different blends of performing and competing 
across organisations in, for example, the same industry or market, provides 
valuable insights into the varying degrees of success and failure and the root 
 5 
causes thereof both in the short and longer term. How an organisation performs 
is essentially concerned with what happens within the boundaries of that 
organisation, its collection of activities and systems and the way in which they 
are managed. It is also about a mindset, Performance Orientation, which draws 
on literature from a diverse range of disciplines and subjects such as psychology, 
performance management and organisational behaviour. How an organisation 
competes, on the other hand, is more externally driven and is primarily 
concerned with how the organisation interacts with others in its chosen 
marketplace. Again this mindset of competition, Competitive Orientation, draws 
on a variety of disciplines like marketing, strategy and, again, psychology. 
 
We begin with performance orientation. Simons et al. (2000) suggest that 
individuals with a high performance orientation are “preoccupied with themselves 
and the way others perceive them” (p.336); there is a clear internal focus in 
terms of both what is done and how those activities should be recognised. This is 
supported by Coad and Berry (1998) who point out that the recognition will be 
driven by peers within the organisation and further elaborated on by Coad 
(1999) who points out the importance of “important others” for recognition 
within the organisation such as those on whom advancement may depend. 
Huddleston and Garvin (1995) point out that in sport what matters is, for 
example, individual runs, goals or points scored much more than the team’s 
result. This point is supported by Porter (2005) who notes that in organisations 
with a strong performance orientation, efforts are usually directed at individuals 
rather than teams or groups. 
 
If the first key characteristic of performance orientation is, therefore, the focus 
internally, then the second key characteristic is the activities and beliefs that 
such an orientation would foster. Porter’s research suggests a view amongst 
those with a performance orientation that there is little value in working on 
something that you are not very good at. Simons et al. argue that this 
orientation is about establishing where competence lies as that is the 
fundamental determinant of outcomes. These competencies, according to Stiles 
et al. (1997) will tend to be managed through clear and strict measures where 
the focus is on optimisation through seemingly endless repetition, practice and 
rehearsal. Unsurprisingly, this orientation often leads to the avoidance of 
challenge, struggle, experiment and innovation (Coad and Berry) and tends to 
work best in environments where there is “a lack of novelty, complexity and 
open-endedness” (Coad, p.114). 
 
In discussing the difference between a performance and a competitive 
orientation, Lyle (1997) suggests that they are part of a continuum and that it is 
likely that organisations and individuals will pass from one to the other. Thus, 
performance orientation is about the development of potential for excellence and 
competitive orientation is about translating that potential into practice in a 
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contested environment. At its most extreme, “hypercompetitiveness”, Ryckman 
et al. (1997) suggest that it is “a need by individuals to compete and win (and 
avoid losing) at any cost” (p.271). More moderately, Covin and Covin (1990) 
suggest that competitive orientation is a “general management disposition 
reflected in a firm’s willingness to take on and desire to dominate competitors 
through a combination of proactive moves and innovative efforts” (p.36). Thus 
the first key factor which differentiates competitive from performance orientation 
is its focus; competitive orientation focuses externally on the market place and 
more explicitly on outcomes rather than processes. 
 
A different focus of attention would, naturally, lead to a different set of activities 
and behaviours. Perry and Shao (2005) identify four key activities and 
behaviours which underpin a competitive orientation. There will be clear 
attention paid to the acquisition and dissemination of competitor information, 
more time will be spent attempting to predict competitor actions, more time will 
be spent attempting to influence competitors and resources will be allocated to 
the identification and exploitation of competitor weaknesses. These activities are 
summed up by Gatignon and Xuereb (1997) who suggest that whilst 
performance orientation is simply about improvements to performance, 
competitive orientation is about improvements to relative performance in order 
to secure a competitive advantage. These issues are developed further by Lyle 
who argues that a competitive orientation is about “the highest levels of 
achievement in competition” (p.314) where the focus is much more likely to be 
on innovation, challenge and risk-taking (Gatignon and Xuereb). 
 
In translating these performance and competitive orientation characteristics into 
a sports context we would suggest the following as summarized in Table 1: 
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Table 1: Key characteristics of performance and competitive 
orientation in a    sporting context 
 
PERFORMANCE ORIENTATION COMPETITIVE ORIENTATION 
Mindset 
 Internal and self centred 
 Process driven, how things are 
done is important 
 The aesthetics of performance 
really matter 
Mindset 
 External and relative 
 Outcomes and what is 
achieved 
 Aesthetics are an optional 
extra and can be easily 
discarded 
Objectives 
 Process based 
 Arrived at through a 
deconstructive process 
 Aimed at self, rarely externally 
compared 
 Sliding scale of achievement 
Objectives 
 Outcome/Result driven 
 Determined in the contested 
arena 
 Targets are set as absolute 
attributes 
 Clear emphasis on current, not 
future, contests 
Focus 
 Reliability within a set of 
parameters 
 Focus on improvements over 
time and fulfilling potential 
 Physical and tangible measures 
of performance 
Focus 
 Reliability under pressure 
 Winning when it counts 
 Outcome/Results driven 
 Mental elements of process 
really matter 
Style 
 Rigid, inflexible, prescriptive 
 Pre-set patterns are important 
 Rehearsal and practice 
Style 
 Adaptive to circumstances 
 Improvisation/Innovation/ 
Emergent 
 Empowering experienced team 
members 
 
Conceptually and diagrammatically the blend of performance and competitive 
orientation creates four possible positions for the players within any given 
contest. The first position is the Ideal Position where the player demonstrates a 
high level of both performance and competitivity. From this position a player will 
dominate the contest, possibly over a long period of time, and the emphasis will 
be on activities and improvements which maintain and enhance the dominant 
position. Players are most likely to find themselves in this position as a result of 
long periods of stability, for example in a world class team where changes in 
constituents have been made in a gradual manner. At the opposite end of this 
position is the Worst Position where players have neither the performance level 
nor the competitive instincts to win out in a contest. In this position, defeat is 
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the most common occurrence and the emphasis may be on building up a young 
team for the future or refreshing a team whose results are in decline. In this 
position, any kind of competitive advantage, no matter how small or fleeting, is 
strived for. The third position, Competitors, is those players who will be able to 
pull off the occasional upset through exploitation of competitive characteristics to 
overcome performance inferiority. The emphasis of activity is likely to be on 
introducing consistency to performance and the exploitation and development of 
potential. The final position, Performers, is for those players who may 
occasionally dominate a contest but are susceptible to defeat when faced with 
pressure situations. Development of these players may emphasize mental 
strength. Figure 1 shows these. 
 
Figure 1: Performance and Competitive Orientation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
Having established the theoretical and contextual foundations of this paper, we 
now turn to explain the methodology through which we examine this conceptual 
model and the underpinning theory. 
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Methodology 
 
The RWC provides an ideal context in which to apply and test the model 
developed in the previous section. The tournament has been played six times 
over the past 20 years and the format has remained reasonably constant with a 
group or league stage followed by three knock-out rounds until the ultimate 
winner is found. This consistency of format is also reflected in consistency 
amongst the participants where the same teams have competed at the top end 
of the RWC in each year it has been held. The RWC, therefore, provides a 
reasonably consistent sample in which it is possible to track changes (and lack of 
changes) in how each team enters into contested situations. The game itself is 
also a useful vehicle because of its nature; unlike sports like football which thrive 
on their simplicity, rugby union is a complicated game and this is reflected in, for 
example, its scoring system. Whilst there is just one way to score in football, in 
rugby union there are four different ways in which points can be scored and 
tracking the patterns of how individual teams score these points can be a useful 
way to measure performance and competitive orientation. 
 
Theoretically driven research is, necessarily, grounded in assumptions. The 
approach we take to analysing the 233 matches in the six RWCs under 
consideration is built on a set of assumptions which begin with the notion that 
the outcome of any sporting contest is based on two things; First, how each 
team in that contest performs and, second, how each team in that contest 
competes. Contestants can be differentiated by their blend of performance and 
competitive characteristics. For example, performance can be a product of such 
things as physical ability, preparation and the quality of training whereas 
competitiveness can be a product of mental toughness and a willingness to 
change strategy and tactics. Over time, therefore, it is likely that, as teams 
develop, their blend of performance and competitiveness will change and this is 
crucial as different forms of contest will require different attributes; success in a 
league or group situation will require a different set of strengths compared to 
success in a knock-out situation. Whilst there will always be teams which excel at 
both performance and competition, it is likely that these teams will be the 
exception rather than rule; most teams will try and use strengths in one area to 
overcome weaknesses in the other. In this context, our final assumption is that 
the team which wins out in a contested situation is the team which has the most 
favourable blend of performance and competitive orientations. 
 
In measuring performance and competitiveness across all the teams who have 
played in the RWC over the past 20 years, there are two central problems to 
overcome. First, as all the teams in the tournament do not play each other, it 
can be difficult to assess relative performance and competitiveness between 
teams who have never met on the field of play. For example, in 2007, the 
winning team, South Africa, played just seven matches against six opponents in 
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a tournament in which 20 teams took part. The second problem is that some 
teams are not only better, but are significantly better, than other teams which 
creates issues of comparability; how do you compare the performance and 
competitiveness of a team which scores, for example, over 100 points against 
the worst team in the tournament with a mid ranking team which loses narrowly 
to one of the better teams? The inevitable outcome of these issues is that 
measuring competitiveness is likely to be much more complicated and 
controversial than measuring performance. It is the latter, however, with which 
we begin. 
 
As rugby union is very much a game driven by statistics and numbers, 
generating measures of performance is relatively simple. All the raw data for this 
paper is taken from the official site of the RWC (www.rugbyworldcup.com). For 
our purposes we have chosen 10 measures of performance which range across 
four broad categories; the results of matches played, performance in attack, 
performance in defence and the manner of victory or defeat. The measures in 
the first category are a simple measure of the proportion of matches won out of 
those matches played by each team and, in order to reward those teams who 
progress further in the tournament, the number of matches won. We also 
measure the scale of victory (or defeat) by measuring the points difference 
between teams in each match. Attacking performance is measured in two ways; 
the average number of points scored and the average number of tries scored in 
each game played. Similarly, defensive performance is measured by average 
points and tries conceded in each match played. Finally we measure the manner 
of victory or defeat by looking at the proportion of points scored from tries (and 
conversions), the strength of each opponent played and the average difference 
between tries scored and conceded in each game. Each of these measures is 
indexed with the best performing team indexed at 100. The indices for each 
measure are then totalled before the sum is then re-indexed in order to generate 
an overall performance orientation index. An example of this for the quarter 
finalists in the 1995 RWC is shown in the table below. 
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Table 2:  Performance Indexes for the quarter finalists in the 1995 
RWC. 
 
 Australia England France Ireland New 
Zealand 
Samoa Scotland South 
Africa 
Proportion 
of matches 
won 
50 67 83 50 83 50 50 100 
Number of 
matches 
won 
33 67 83 33 83 33 33 100 
Points 
difference 
per game 
76 67 82 59 100 60 91 78 
Points 
scored per 
game 
50 48 56 48 100 50 82 44 
Tries scored 
per game 
44 27 41 48 100 51 73 32 
Points 
conceded 
per game 
68 46 77 34 56 34 60 100 
Tries 
conceded 
per game 
83 31 100 26 42 24 42 100 
Proportion 
of points 
from tries 
79 47 59 87 87 82 76 59 
Strength of 
opposition 
65 89 73 85 77 75 79 83 
Tries 
difference 
per game 
80 59 80 65 100 65 87 75 
Total 627 548 735 535 829 525 673 771 
Performance 
Orientation 
Index 
76 66 89 65 100 63 81 93 
(Source: www.rugbyworldcup.com) 
 
Having explained the measurement of performance for each team we now turn 
to the measurement of competitiveness. Given that some of the characteristics of 
competitive orientation which mark it out as different to a performance 
orientation are the focus on measures which are absolute, relative and external, 
it is in this area that we deal with the problems of comparability mentioned 
earlier. We begin with a discussion of what we would expect to see from a team 
with a high competitive orientation. On the basis of the theory and concept 
discussed previously, we would suggest that a competitive team would have a 
number of characteristics such as an ability to win matches despite poor 
performances, an ability to win matches in an unaesthetic or ugly manner, an 
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ability to win matches against better opposition and an ability to win high 
pressure matches in, for example, the knock-out stages of the tournament. In 
measuring these characteristics a weighting system was developed based on the 
performance index above with the best performing team in each RWC weighted 
at 1 and all other teams compared to this. In the example in Table 2, therefore, 
in the 1995 RWC New Zealand were weighted at 1, South Africa at 0.93, France 
at 0.89, Scotland at 0.81 down to Samoa weighted at 0.63. 
 
In measuring competitiveness, five different measures were generated and this 
weighting system was then used in four of them. All results in all games were 
recalculated on the basis of the weightings. For example, when New Zealand 
played Japan in the 1995 RWC the result was a victory by 145 points to 17. 
Using the weighting system, each point New Zealand scored was rated at 0.35 
(Japan’s weighting) and each point Japan scored was rated at 1 (New Zealand’s 
weighting) giving a weighted victory to New Zealand by 50.75 points to 17. Table 
3 shows how the weighting system worked for the all the games played by the 
tournament winners, South Africa (weighted at 0,93). Under this weighting 
system, South Africa would have narrowly lost one of their games. 
 
Table 3: Actual and weighted results for South Africa in the 1995 
RWC 
 
Opponent Australia Romania Canada Samoa France New 
Zealand 
Weighting 0.76 0.32 0.56 0.63 0.89 1.00 
Actual 
points 
scored 
27 21 20 42 19 15 
Weighted 
points 
scored 
20.52 6.72 11.20 26.46 16.91 15.00 
Actual 
points 
conceded 
18 8 0 14 15 12 
Weighted 
points 
conceded 
16.74 7.44 0 13.02 19.95 11.16 
Actual 
result 
Won by 9 Won by 13 Won by 20 Won by 28 Won by 4 Won by 3 
Weighed 
result 
Won by 
3.78 
Lost by 
0.72  
Won by 
11.20 
Won by 
13.44 
Won by 
2.96 
Won by 
3.84 
(Source: www.rugbyworldcup.com) 
 
On the basis of this calculation, two measures of competitiveness were 
generated; the proportion of weighted matches won and the number of weighted 
matches won. The weighting system was also used in assessing the quality of 
opposition through the average weighting of opponents in the group stages of 
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the tournament and the average weighting of opponents in matches won. The 
final measure of competitiveness was the proportion of total points scored by 
each team from penalties and drop goals as a proxy for the team’s ability to win 
matches without scoring tries. Each measure was indexed with the leading team 
indexed at 100, the indices were added together and a final competitive 
orientation index was created in the same way as in calculating the performance 
orientation index. An example of this is shown in the table below for the same 
teams shown earlier in the 1995 RWC. 
 
Table 4: Competitiveness Indexes for the quarter finalists in the 
1995 RWC. 
 
 Australia England France Ireland New 
Zealand 
Samoa Scotland South 
Africa 
Proportion of 
weighted 
matches won 
60 80 80 30 100 60 60 100 
Number of 
weighted 
matches won 
40 80 80 20 100 40 40 100 
Average 
weighting of 
group 
opponents 
79 74 72 87 71 75 76 72 
Average 
weighting of 
opponents 
beaten 
47 66 72 68 67 57 45 83 
Proportion of 
points from 
penalties and 
drop goals 
39 86 69 27 27 34 44 69 
Total 266 385 373 231 365 266 265 423 
Competitive 
Orientation 
Index 
63 91 88 55 86 63 63 100 
(Source: www.rugbyworldcup.com) 
 
The key test of these measures is the extent to which they are valid and reliable; 
do they measure what they are supposed to measure and do they get the right 
result on a consistent basis? One of the advantages of using the RWC as an 
example is that all the results are known and so it is possible to compare the 
results of our analysis with what actually happened during the tournaments. In 
order to do this, two further elements were added to the analysis. First, the 
indices for performance and competitive orientation were plotted on a matrix 
based on the conceptual model developed in the previous section in order to 
allow for some kind of comparison of the way in which different teams compete 
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across the whole tournament. An example from the 1995 RWC is shown in Figure 
2 below. 
 
Figure 2: Performance-Competitiveness matrix for the 1995 RWC 
 
 
(Source: www.rugbyworldcup.com) 
 
Having established the relative positions of all teams in the RWC on the basis of 
performance and competitiveness, we then analysed the positions of each team 
on the basis of the combination of performance and competitiveness. This we did 
by the simple mathematical expedient of multiplying one by the other, the 
product of the two orientations we refer to as the team’s PC Score. Table 5 
below gives a summary of performance orientation, competitive orientation and 
PC Score for the 8 teams used so far in the 1995 RWC 
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Table 5: Performance Orientation, Competitive Orientation and PC 
Score for the quarter finalists in the 1995 RWC 
 
 Australia England France Ireland New 
Zealand 
Samoa Scotland South 
Africa 
Performance 
Orientation 
76 66 89 65 100 63 81 93 
Competitive 
Orientation 
63 91 88 55 86 63 63 100 
PC Score 4788 6006 7832 3575 8600 3969 5103 9300 
(Source: www.rugbyworldcup.com) 
 
The validity and reliability of this approach is first tested on a match by match 
basis. If the PC Score generated for each team is an accurate reflection of that 
team’s ability then, ceteris paribus, the team with the higher PC Score should 
beat the team with the lower PC Score whenever they played against each other. 
The second element to the testing of reliability and validity was the extent to 
which this approach identified two things. First, did it correctly identify the team 
that won the tournament overall; did the team with the highest PC Score win the 
RWC? Second, did the approach identify the relative positions in which each 
team finished in the RWC? Across all of these measures and assessments, the 
approach has proven to be both reliable and valid. Over the 20 years of the 
RWC, 233 matches have been played and our approach identifies the winner in 
215 of those matches. This represents a success rate of 92%. The matches in 
which it failed to identify the winner were either matches that ended up as a 
draw or matches with a significant upset. In terms of the tournament as a whole, 
the approach correctly identifies 21 out of the total of 24 semi-finalists across all 
six RWCs and, in every single case, correctly identifies the winner of the 
tournament. We now turn to present the results of our analysis across the six 
RWCs played between 1987 and 2007. 
 
Findings 
 
In presenting our findings we will begin with some general points about the 
nature of competition in the RWC before moving onto a more specific discussion 
of how teams enter into contests. Over the twenty years that the RWC has been 
held, there have been two winners who have absolutely dominated the 
tournament from start to finish. In 1987 New Zealand won with performance 
levels almost one quarter higher than their nearest rivals and competitiveness 
higher by almost 15%. In 1999, Australia won the RWC, again by dominating the 
tournament albeit not at the same level as New Zealand eight years previously. 
As an example, Figure 3 below shows each team in the 1999 RWC plotted onto 
the performance-competitiveness matrix developed earlier and clearly shows 
Australia as the outstanding team with a number of other teams competing at or 
about the same levels of performance and competitiveness.  
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Figure 3: Performance-Competitiveness matrix for the 1999 RWC 
 
 
(Source: www.rugbyworldcup.com) 
 
As a point of contrast with the 1987 and 1999 tournaments, all the other 
tournaments have seen winners who have competed in very different ways; 
None of the other tournaments have seen a single team dominate but rather 
they have seen a number of teams contesting at similar levels overall. In these 
tournaments the winner has had a slightly different blend of performance and 
competitiveness to the other teams. In 1991, for example, Australia won 
primarily on the basis of having higher performance than other teams but, in the 
1995, 2003 and 2007 tournaments, the winning teams were those with the 
highest levels of competitiveness. In each of these cases, the performance levels 
of the winners, whilst being high, were not the highest in the tournament and 
these gaps in performance level were plugged by superiority in competitiveness. 
Figure 4 offers an illustration of this with the most recent RWC held in 2007. 
Despite being only the third best team by performance, South Africa were able to 
win on the basis of their competitiveness. 
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Figure 4: Performance-Competitiveness matrix for the 2007 RWC 
 
 
(Source: www.rugbyworldcup.com) 
 
Overall, our first general conclusion about all this is that high levels of 
performance are a fundamental prerequisite for success in the RWC; absolutely 
all of the winners had high levels of performance and so a poor team has never 
won the RWC. However, under some circumstances, the highest levels of 
performance are not sufficient in themselves to deliver the ultimate outcome. 
Successful teams also need to demonstrate high levels of competitiveness. This 
is shown in the matrix for the 2007 RWC and, as another point of reference, we 
could also consider England’s victory in the 2003 tournament. In 2003 there 
were three teams operating with high levels of performance; Australia, New 
Zealand and England had performance levels of between 100 and 96 and, under 
these conditions, competitiveness was the main determinant of who won overall. 
As Figure 5 shows, whilst there was little too choose between the three teams in 
terms of performance, there were significant gaps in competitiveness with 
England dominating by a significant margin. Thus when the performance of 
teams clusters around the same level, competitiveness will probably be decisive. 
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Figure 5: Performance-Competitiveness matrix for the 2003 RWC 
 
 
(Source: www.rugbyworldcup.com) 
 
If, under some conditions, it is possible to overcome performance deficiencies, it 
is also important to consider when those conditions do not apply. Our analysis 
suggests that when the performance of one team is significantly superior, no 
amount of competitiveness will overcome it. For example in the 2003 RWC, 
whilst South Africa enjoyed a significant performance advantage over Georgia, 
the latter team enjoyed an advantage in competitiveness. However, this 
superiority was not a big enough advantage as South Africa won the game 
between the two teams by a margin of almost 30 points. In some games, 
perhaps, victory by one team is almost inevitable, especially when there is a 
large gap in performance. Rather obviously, this would also apply when one 
team enjoys an overwhelming superiority over all others in both orientations. 
Figure 6 shows the performance-competitiveness matrix for the first RWC in 
1987 where New Zealand enjoyed such an overwhelming advantage that their 
victory was, to a large extent, inevitable. 
 
 19 
Figure 6: Performance-Competitiveness matrix for the 1987 RWC 
 
 
(Source: www.rugbyworldcup.com) 
 
Whilst it is interesting to examine the nature and extent of competition in each 
individual tournament, it is also important to examine the patterns of competition 
that have developed across all six tournaments. Whilst for many the essence of 
sport is its unpredictability, our analysis suggests that the RWC is actually 
relatively stable and predictable over time. In examining teams who have 
competed in a minimum of four RWCs, over the course of all the tournaments, 
three distinct clusters of teams have developed. At the top of the performance 
and competitiveness scales are five teams who frequently appear in the semi-
finals, four of whom have won the tournament as a whole. In the middle is a 
second cluster made up of seven teams. These teams will frequently reach the 
quarter final stage of the tournament but usually go no further. Finally at the 
bottom is a cluster of teams who seem to be locked at this level and have hardly 
ever progressed from the group stages of any of the tournaments. Figure 7 
shows these clusters. 
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Figure 7: Clusters of teams in the RWC 
 
(Source: www.rugbyworldcup.com) 
 
This clustering of teams gives further insights into the nature of competition in 
the RWC. Our argument would be that there are pockets of intense competition 
within clusters but a limited amount of competition between clusters. Over the 
six tournaments only a small number of teams have made the shift upwards 
between clusters. In 1991 Canada were able to make the quarter finals and 
Wales, Scotland and Argentina have made the semi-finals in 1987, 1991 and 
2007 respectively. There has also been some movement downwards; all the 
teams in the top cluster have failed to reach the semi-finals at least once and 
similarly most of the teams in the middle cluster have failed to progress from the 
group stages at least once. What is striking, however, is the temporary nature of 
these movements; when teams have moved up or down in one tournament, they 
usually revert back to their normal cluster in the next one. This implies that this 
competitive structure is reasonably permanent and Table 6 illustrates this point 
by considering the average PC Score between each cluster. 
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Table 6: Average PC Score difference between clusters 
 
 Average PC Score 
difference between top and 
middle clusters 
Average PC Score difference 
between middle and bottom 
clusters 
1987 2357 1617 
1991 3300 2032 
1995 3833 802 
1999 3414 2143 
2003 2884 1882 
2007 3133 1706 
(Source: www.rugbyworldcup.com) 
 
This lack of mobility is, therefore, an underlying trend in the RWC. For example, 
when the gap between top and middle was at its closest since 1987, in 2003, no 
team was able to break through into the highest cluster and, in 1995, when the 
gap between the middle and bottom clusters was at its lowest, again no team 
was able to break out into the higher cluster. Over time, the gap between the 
team at the top and the middle and between those in the middle and at the 
bottom has, if anything, widened. Given this stability, we now turn to examine 
the dynamics of competition within clusters and will use the top cluster 
containing the top 5 teams in the RWC as an example. 
 
Figure 8 shows the quality of opposition faced by the winners of each RWC on 
the basis of their opponents PC Score. What the figure shows, amongst other 
things, is that there are two ways in which teams have built up competitiveness 
prior to playing in the final. In 1995 and 2003, competitiveness was developed in 
the tournament by a gradual ratcheting up of the quality of opposition where the 
tournament winners were not required to make a sudden or dramatic step up in 
the quality of opposition. In the other tournaments, competitiveness in the final 
was built by playing the strongest opposition earlier on the in tournament; in 
1987, 1991, 1999 and 2007 the winning team had faced tougher opposition in 
the build up to the final than in the final itself. The final may well, therefore, 
have been the highest pressure match but it was not played against the 
strongest opposition. 
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Figure 8: Quality of opposition faced by RWC winners by PC Score 
 
 
(Source: www.rugbyworldcup.com) 
 
The patterns of quality of opposition faced by the winners is in stark contrast to 
that faced by the runners up in each tournament. Figure 9 shows the quality of 
opposition faced by the losing finalists in each tournament and, as in Figure 8, 
the game against the strongest opposition is highlighted. What this reinforces is 
the notion that it is the blend of both performance and competitiveness that 
matters in winning the tournament overall. In each RWC the runner-up has 
played their toughest game in the final, which they lost, and in most cases that 
final represented a significant step up in the quality of opposition. For example, 
in 1995 New Zealand went into the final having scored significantly more points 
and tries than anyone else. However, this performance advantage had been 
gained against relatively weak opposition whereas the winning finalists, South 
Africa, had more narrowly beaten significantly tougher opposition throughout the 
tournament. This development of competitiveness may well have proved the 
difference in a close final in which just three points separated winner and loser. 
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Figure 9: Quality of opposition faced by RWC runners-up by PC Score 
 
 
 
(Source: www.rugbyworldcup.com) 
 
The example of New Zealand losing the 1995 final to South Africa is an important 
one as it illustrates the limits of performance superiority without competitiveness. 
As Figure E showed, New Zealand are the highest performing team across all six 
tournaments. During these tournaments they have scored more points and tries 
than any other team, they are the only team to have won all of their group 
games and in half of all the RWCs they have been the best performing team. 
However, they have rarely been able to translate this performance superiority 
into overall victory as they have won the RWC just once. Our explanation of this 
would be that they have lacked the necessary competitiveness. For example, 
across all the games they have played in the RWC, New Zealand have failed to 
win the try count in just five of them. All of these games have been lost and New 
Zealand have been eliminated from the tournament. As Figure 10 shows, in four 
out of these five games, New Zealand have had to make a distinct step up in the 
quality of opposition faced and have failed to do that. In this case, 
competitiveness is not built through heavy point and try scoring against the 
weakest opposition. 
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Figure 10:  Quality of opposition faced by New Zealand by PC Score 
 
 
 
(Source: www.rugbyworldcup.com) 
 
If the New Zealand example shows the limitations of performance without 
competitiveness then an examination of England in the RWC shows the limits of 
competitiveness without performance. Over the course of the six tournaments, 
England have consistently been the most competitive team. As we have seen 
already, their victory in the 2003 tournament was achieved on the basis of their 
superior competitiveness and they have also reached two other finals in 1991 
and 2007. Figure 11 below shows the performance-competitiveness matrix for 
the 1991 RWC. 
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Figure 11:  Performance-Competitiveness matrix for the 1991 RWC 
 
 
(Source: www.rugbyworldcup.com) 
 
In 1991 England were able to reach the final despite playing France and Scotland 
in the quarter and semi-finals respectively, two teams which enjoyed a significant 
advantage in performance. This performance deficit was overcome by England’s 
superior competitiveness. There was a similar pattern in 2007 (see Figure B) 
where England beat the superior performing Australia and France. Table 7 
illustrates the gaps in performance and competitiveness that England 
encountered in the 1991 and 2007 tournaments. 
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Table 7: Performance and competitiveness gaps encountered by 
England 
 
 Performance Gap (%) Competitiveness Gap 
(%) 
Result 
1991 RWC 
France -3.6 +31.6 Victory 
Scotland -13.0 +6.4 Victory 
Australia -20.0 +8.7 Defeat 
2007 RWC 
Australia -27.5 +29.9 Victory 
France -8.3 +25.0 Victory 
South Africa -26.7 +6.4 Defeat 
(Source: www.rugbyworldcup.com) 
 
As the table shows, competitive superiority was only able to take England so far 
in each of two tournaments. In 1991, relatively small performance differences 
were overcome by competitive superiority but the gap between England and the 
winner of the 1991 RWC, Australia, was simply too wide to bridge. The 2007 
example illustrates the complexity of the relationship and blend between 
performance and competitiveness. For example, England were able to beat 
Australia despite a larger performance differential than against South Africa to 
whom they lost in the final. The explanation for this lies in the competitiveness 
advantage which England enjoyed against these two opponents; it was large 
enough to compensate against Australia but not against South Africa.  
 
Our main conclusion from this analysis is that explaining success in this 
tournament requires a multi-dimensional approach which takes account of both 
performance and competitiveness and, crucially, the relationship between the 
two. Whilst the tournament has, to an extent, stabilised into distinct clusters of 
teams with little movement or dynamic between them, within each cluster 
competition is dynamic and subject to change. Where there is change, from 
tournament to tournament, it is through teams changing their blends. 
Historically, whilst teams have done well through being strong in either 
performing or competing, teams have only ever won the tournament when they 
have the right blend of these characteristics. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The main aim of this paper was to explore the versatility of management 
theories and concepts by using them to explore a non-management phenomena. 
Having analysed the six RWCs that have taken place since 1987, this final section 
will consider three issues. First, we will briefly discuss the lessons for sport 
generally and rugby union specifically from this analysis. Second, we will 
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consider the extent to which lessons can be learnt for both the theory and 
practice of management and, finally, we will consider the future directions that 
research in this area could take. 
 
Damon Runyon suggested that whilst the race may not always be to the swift 
and the battle to the strong, that was usually “the way to bet”. In this context, 
the academic answer to the simple question of whether the best team always 
wins the Rugby World Cup is always likely to be “depends”. It depends on how 
the best team is defined and measured and it also depends on how the best 
team plays. One of the contradictions of sport is that outcomes are always 
relatively easy to measure but processes are much more open to debate. 
Outcomes will tend to come in the form of win, lose or draw but the multitude of 
internal and external factors which make up the process of playing and 
competing frequently defies simple explanations. In trying to understand this 
complexity of process, our first suggestion is that high performance is frequently 
not enough. It matters massively because it is the basic entry level criteria for 
success of any sort but, in a sporting environment where the contestants are 
often more similar than they are different, it is only one part of the equation. The 
other part is competitiveness which is more opaque, difficult to define and harder 
to measure. Just as great sporting teams are defined by their combinations, arte 
et labore, so to are sporting outcomes explained by their combinations of 
performing and competing. In an ideal situation, teams will have both but, as the 
New Zealand teams post 1987 have shown, this combination is usually the 
exception rather than the rule. 
 
We are wary of drawing any general conclusions about management from the 
theory and evidence contained in this paper. Most management research is 
context specific and this paper is no different as it deals with a very specific and 
non-traditional example. Instead of general lessons, therefore, we would much 
rather consider how this example reinforces existing theories of management. In 
his poem “Heavy Date” W.H. Auden talked about how life is a collection of 
“emphatic dogmas”. The general study of management suggests that it is all 
about the generation, allocation and organisation of available resources and, in 
the management field of strategy, the emphatic dogma is that of the relationship 
between the organisation and its environment. There is much in our analysis that 
reinforces these dogmas and so, disappointingly perhaps, the best we have to 
offer to the study of management is further proof of something we already know 
to be true. Whilst there may be little that is new or novel for management, we 
have at least demonstrated its versatility in examining an essentially non-
management phenomena in a way that generate robust conclusions that are 
both valid and reliable. 
 
Usually the most interesting element of management research is not the 
arguments that are closed or debates that are settled but rather the avenues of 
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investigation which are opened up. This paper opens up two avenues, one 
theoretical and conceptual in nature and the other more contextual. Theoretically 
and conceptually there is still much work to be done in further developing ideas 
about performance and competitive orientation. The theoretical intervention 
offered in this paper is primarily post-rational in nature and is based around 
assessment of these orientations after they have taken place. Perhaps, therefore, 
there is scope for further investigation which aims to predict such behaviour. 
Contextually, the robustness of the conclusions can be investigated further with 
expansion of the analysis into other sports, the options for which are many in 
terms of sports with a heavy numbers orientation such as cricket, baseball, 
tennis and golf. The success of this paper should not be judged on its own 
impact factor but rather the extent to which like minded (or otherwise) social 
scientist extend the theoretical and contextual discussions.  
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